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Social orientationIn social environments, it is crucial that decision-makers take account of the impact of their actions not only for
oneself, but also on other social agents. Previous work has identiﬁed neural signals in the striatum encoding
value-based prediction errors for outcomes to oneself; also, recentwork suggests that neural activity in prefrontal
cortex may similarly encode value-based prediction errors related to outcomes to others. However, prior work
also indicates that social valuations are not isomorphic, with social value orientations of decision-makers ranging
on a cooperative to competitive continuum; this variation has not been examined within social learning
environments. Here, we combine a computational model of learning with functional neuroimaging to examine
how individual differences in orientation impact neural mechanisms underlying ‘other-value’ learning. Across
four experimental conditions, reinforcement learning signals for other-valuewere identiﬁed inmedial prefrontal
cortex, and were distinct from self-value learning signals identiﬁed in striatum. Critically, the magnitude and
direction of the other-value learning signal depended strongly on an individual's cooperative or competitive ori-
entation toward others. These data indicate that social decisions are guided by a social orientation-dependent
learning system that is computationally similar but anatomically distinct from self-value learning. The sensitivity
of the medial prefrontal learning signal to social preferences suggests a mechanism linking such preferences to
biases in social actions and highlights the importance of incorporating heterogeneous social predispositions in
neurocomputational models of social behavior.
Published by Elsevier Inc.Introduction
Navigating one's environment, whether it be foraging for food or
interacting with social partners, requires evaluating available options
and taking actions that are likely to beneﬁt oneself. The application of
formal learning models to the analysis of decision-related neural activ-
ity has begun to reveal the neural basis of computations underlying
value-guided decision-making in humans (D'Ardenne et al., 2008;
Daniel and Pollmann, 2014; Jocham et al., 2011). These data have
shown that individuals learn the value associated with an action
through experience by serially comparing expectations with outcomesedial prefrontal cortex; PES, pre-
g.−$70)receivedforoneself(i.e.
eceived by another person; Vs,
nishments delivered to Other.
rch Institute, 2, Riverside Circle,(Krugel et al., 2009; Seymour et al., 2004; Sutton and Barto, 1998).
Through this general process, humans dynamically learn how to value
their actions and their environment, and dopaminergic signaling is be-
lieved to underlie these learning signals (Bayer and Glimcher, 2005;
Delgado et al., 2008; den Ouden et al., 2010; Montague et al., 2006;
Schultz et al., 1997).
This process becomes more complicated when making decisions
that also impact others, whether friend, partner, adversary, or stranger.
To successfully navigate such social transactions, it is crucial that
decision-makers be able to assess (i) the value of the decision for one-
self and (ii) the value of the decision to others, based upon one's own
motivations toward oneself and the social partner. Previous studies
have identiﬁed brain signals associated with outcomes delivered to
oneself (Delgado et al., 2008; Galvan et al., 2005; Pessiglione et al.,
2006; Ramnani et al., 2004) and outcomes delivered to others (Apps
et al., 2013; Nicolle et al., 2012; O'Connell et al., 2013; Suzuki et al.,
2012).
However, it is relatively less well understood how outcomes deliv-
ered to others are implemented in reinforcement learning environments.
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comes that involve other agents, depends on social preferences or moti-
vations that can vary across individuals. For example, competitive types
seek outcomes beneﬁting oneself at the expense of the social partner,
while cooperative types seek outcomes beneﬁting both self and other
(Fehr and Krajbich, 2014; Lurie, 1987; McClintock and Liebrand, 1988;
Murphy and Ackermann, 2014). Studies of inequality aversion and
guilt aversion have identiﬁed neural correlates of preferences over divi-
sions of resources (Chang et al., 2011; Crockett et al., 2010; Fliessbach
et al., 2007;Haruno and Frith, 2010; Tricomi et al., 2010),whilemeasures
of social value orientation have identiﬁed individual differences in neural
correlates of these preferences (Haruno and Frith, 2010). However, the
role of social preferences has not been taken into account in tasks that re-
quire learning the consequence of one's own action for social partners.
Here we examine the process by which decision-makers learn how
actions map onto outcomes for others. In doing so, we ﬁrst identify
learning signals underlying value-based decision-making for others
and differentiate these signals from value-based learning signals for
oneself, replicating and extending previous research efforts; subse-
quently we show how these signals vary parametrically as a function
of social value orientation. That is, in a large cohort of participants, we
show that the direction and magnitude of learning signals based on
the value of an outcome for a social partner vary with the cooperative
or competitive orientation of the participant.Materials and methods
Overview of procedures
Prior to scanning, the social value orientation (competitive, individ-
ualistic or cooperative) of participants was assessed through a paramet-
ric estimation by a sequential testing procedure (PEST; Luce, 2000). In
this assessment, participants chose between allocations of an endowment
between the participant and an anonymous social partner. Participants
were then instructed that they would make a series of choices while inFig. 1. Social value learning task and learningmodel. (a) Each trial beganwith aﬁxation cross (~2
options were displayed until a decision was submitted by keypress (limited to 3 s). The chosen
maker and the social partner were revealed for 2 s. In each of six conditions, each participant
decision-maker, as well as probabilistic gain (or loss) for a social partner. (b) Hybrid learning m
for the actor and a different outcome for the social partner simultaneously. Following typical rein
value (EV) of a choice at time t via prediction errors (PE)weighted by a learning rate (α). Reward
mechanism with the difference that the value is subjectively transformed (pink inset) accor
orientation will transform a positive outcome to a negative subjective value, thus producing athe MRI scanner (Fig. 1). Additionally, they were told that their payment
and the payment of the anonymous social partner would be based on a
random subset of their choices. Seventy-two participants underwent 3T
fMRI as they performed six manipulations of an instrumental learning
task. In each condition, participants chose between two square fractals
that were probabilistically (80:20) related to gains or losses for the
decision-maker and another, unknown to them, participant (for in-
stance $70 for the participant and−$70 for the other participant). The
manipulations varied in the magnitude and valence of value assigned to
oneself and the value assigned to the social partner. The order in which
blocks were presented was pseudorandomized across participants.
Participants
Ninety participants (mean age 27.37 years; 28 female)were recruit-
ed froma college and community sample. Ten participantswere exclud-
ed following the social value orientation assessment described below, as
the PEST (Luce, 2000) procedure did not produce reliable estimates
across repeated measures. Seven additional subjects were excluded
fromneuroimaging analysis based on excessivemovement during scan-
ning. One subject was excluded as behavioral responses were not re-
corded for 40% of his/her trials. One condition [self −70/other −70;
self +70/other +70] of a second subject was excluded for missing be-
havioral responses as well.
Social value orientation assessment (see Fig. SM1)
We employed a psychophysics-inspired non-learning choice task
designed to assess social value orientation (SVO; (McClintock and
Liebrand, 1988); (Kelly and Stahelski, 1970; Kuhlman and Marshello,
1975; Sattler and Kerr, 1991; Van Lange and Kuhlman, 1994)). During
the PEST procedure, participants serially made preference choices
between two allocations. Each allocation included a number of points
for the participant and a number of points to another anonymouspartic-
ipant. The two allocationswere represented by a pair of numbers placeds) indicating the onset of a new trial. Twounique fractal stimuli representing twodecision
stimulus was subsequently framed for ~1.5 s, after which the outcomes for the decision-
made 30 choices between two options associated with probabilistic gain (or loss) for the
odel of self-value and preference-dependent other-value. Choices produced an outcome
forcement learning algorithms, rewards received for self (blue circle) update the expected
s that are delivered to the social partner (red circle— ‘other’) are also updated by the same
ding to social preferences, represented by the γ coefﬁcient. For example, a competitive
negative prediction error.
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ed the number of points for the participant whereas the other row indi-
cated the number of points for the second person. To increase the
attention to both types of outcomes, the position of the ‘self’ and
‘other’ amounts (top or bottom row) was randomly determined on
each trial. The participant pressed one of two keys to indicate the pre-
ferred choice. Following the key press, the choice was highlighted in
red for 1 s and then a new trial started. The participant was informed
that: (i) s/he would never meet the ‘other’ person or know each other's
identity; (ii) the other personwould be paid according to one, randomly
determined, choice outcome; and, (iii) the other person would not
make similar or any kind of decisions inﬂuencing the participant's
payment.
Initial allocations
The allocation pairs presented to the participant for each decision
were based on a two-dimensional geometric representation of value,
where the x-axis represents outcomes to ‘self’whereas the y-axis repre-
sents outcomes to ‘other’ (SM Fig. 1b). Allocations were positioned on a
circle with a center at (0,0) and radius of 100. Initially, the allocations
were rounded so that they were in multiples of 5. For example, an allo-
cation with an angle of 45° between self and other axes and radius of
100 equals x-value of 70.7 (rounded to 70) and y-value of 70.7 (rounded
to 70). The algorithmstarted by offering twodifferent allocations. To en-
sure that the social value orientation derived from this procedure was
reliable, we repeated the procedure three times during the same exper-
imental session with differing initial allocations: in the ﬁrst case, initial
allocations were [SELF b 0, OTHER b 0] and [SELF b 0, OTHER N 0]; in
the second case, initial allocations were [SELF b 0, OTHER N0] and
[SELF N 0, OTHER b 0]; and in the ﬁnal case, initial allocations were
[SELF b 0, OTHER b0] and [SELF N 0, OTHER N 0].
Subsequent allocations
The values of the subsequent choice pairs were determined in part,
by allocations of the previous choice pairs: the algorithm retained the
unchosen allocation as one option whereas the chosen allocation was
moved toward the unchosen option with a step angle derived from a
uniform distribution with a mean of (2 ∗ π/40) radians (9°). The
resulting values were again rounded to a multiple of 5. Based on this al-
gorithm the two vectors gradually approximated the preferred vector
for each participant. On each step the algorithm would check whether
the step was larger than the difference between the two options, in
order to prevent one option ‘crossing’ the other one (i.e. the originally
more cooperative alternative becoming more competitive). If the step
was larger then it could take one of the following actions:
1) Reduce the step to half. If the difference between the two alterna-
tives was smaller than half of the step then it would move to
algorithms (2) or (3), as described below.
2) Change the values of the unchosen alternative by adding
(or subtracting, depending on the direction of the change) 5 points
to self- and other-values. If this also resulted in allocations ‘crossing’
each other then the algorithm (3) was implemented.
3) Change the values of the unchosen alternative by adding
(or subtracting, depending on the direction of the change) 2 points
to self- and other-values.
Notice that the algorithm could choose to directly implement
(2) without implementing (1); also (3) could be directly implemented,
without the need of implementing (1) and (2).
Final allocation
On each trial, the algorithm checked whether it should stop. If both
the difference between the two ‘self’ values and the difference between
the two ‘other’ values were smaller than 6 points, then the algorithm
stopped. The average of the two angles associated with the ﬁnal two al-
locations for each assessment was used as the measure of SVO.This sequential testing algorithm yielded social value orientation
measurements with strong test–retest reliability. Participants made
choices in three separate assessments, and each version had different
initial allocations (see description above). Estimated angles across the
assessments showed strong test–retest reliability (mean R2 = .54). To
exclude the minority of participants with unreliable measures of SVO,
any participant with a difference between SVO measurements greater
than 15°was excluded. Of the 90participants assessed, tenwere exclud-
ed based on this criterion. The test–retest reliability of the remaining
participants was high (mean R2 = .92). The boundary criteria for the
three groups (cooperative, individualists and competitive)were deﬁned
as the mean SVO of the sample plus (cooperative threshold) or minus
(competitive threshold) a half standard deviation of the sample (yield-
ing 10.16° and−9.57° as boundaries). The average SVOmeasures of the
included participants are depicted in SM Fig. 2, and individual SVO esti-
mates for each individual are reported in SM Table 2.
Social value learning task (fMRI)
Prior to scanning, all participants received instructions about the
mechanics of the tasks, and it was explained to each participant that
they would be making choices that would form the basis of their own
payment and the payment of a second person. The participant was in-
formed that: (i) s/he would never meet the other person or know
each other's identity; (ii) the other person would be paid according to
the outcomes of a randomly chosen subset of decisions; and, (iii) the
other person would not be making similar decisions for the participant.
The scanning session was separated into 6 blocks. Each block
consisted of 30 trials in which participants chose between two squares
depicting fractals. Six different fractals were used, so players learned
values associated with each fractal a single time, and fractals were ran-
domly positioned to the left or right of a ﬁxation cross. The outcomes as-
sociated with each fractal were randomly determined for each
participant. Within each block, one fractal was associated with one allo-
cation with 80% probability and a second allocation with 20% probabil-
ity. The other fractal was associated with the ﬁrst allocation with 20%
probability and the second outcomewith 80% probability. The probabil-
ities on each trial were pseudorandom, so that every 10 trials included 2
less probable outcomes.
The allocations for each block were as follows, where ε is a uniform
discrete distribution with mean 0 and range of 10:
• [Self:−70 + ε, Other:−70 + ε] vs. [Self:−70 + ε, Other: +70 + ε]
• [Self:−70 + ε, Other:−70 + ε] vs. [Self: +70 + ε, Other:−70 + ε]
• [Self:−70 + ε, Other:−70 + ε] vs. [Self: +70 + ε, Other: +70 + ε]
• [Self:−70 + ε, Other: +70 + ε] vs. [Self:+70 + ε, Other:−70 + ε]
• [Self:−70 + ε, Other: +70 + ε] vs. [Self: +70 + ε, Other: +70 + ε]
• [Self: +70+ ε, Other:−70+ ε] vs. [Self: +70+ ε, Other: +70+ ε].
Each trial beganwith a 1 s ﬁxation cross on a black background, plus a
value derived froman exponential distributionwithmean of 1 s, truncat-
ed at 6 s. On the next screen two fractals appeared on the left and right of
a ﬁxation cross that subtended 10° of visual ﬁeld. Participants were re-
quired to respond within 3 s by choosing a left or right button. The cho-
sen stimulus was framed by a white square for 0.5 s plus a value derived
from an exponential distributionwithmean of 1 s, truncated at 6 s. Then
the outcome allocation (i.e., outcome for self and outcome for other)was
displayed for 2 s (Fig. 1). The order in which blocks were presented was
pseudorandomized across participants.
Computational modeling
We monitored decision-related hemodynamic activity with func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging, and subsequently modeled these
data using two prediction error regressors generated by ﬁtting partici-
pant choices to a reinforcement learning model of reward for oneself
and a social partner (Fig. 1b). Within this hybrid model, the “self
Fig. 2. Conditions of the experiment testing for ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ Prediction Error. In each
condition participants learn by trial and error the following contingencies: (a) Self
PE (1): Option A offers +70 to the decision maker and +70 to the Other participant
[S+/O+] with P = 80% or−70 to the decision maker and +70 to the Other participant
[S−/O+]with P= 20%. Option B offers the same outcomes but with opposite contingen-
cies [S+/O+]with P=20% or [S−/O+]with P=80%. Notice that both options offer pos-
itive outcomes toOther; therefore, choice behavior and learning is primarily guidedby Self
PE. (b) Self PE (2): Option A offers +70 to the decision maker and −70 to the Other
participant [S+/O−] with P = 80% or−70 to the decision maker and−70 to the Other
participant [S−/O−] with P= 20%. Option B offers the same outcomes but with opposite
contingencies. Notice that both options offer negative outcomes to Other. (c) Other PE (1):
Option A offers +70 to the decision maker and +70 to the Other participant [S−/O−]
with P = 80% or +70 to the decision maker and−70 to the Other participant [S−/O−]
with P= 20%. Option B offers the same outcomes but with opposite contingencies. Notice
that both options offer positive outcomes to Self; therefore, choice behavior and learning is
primarily guided byOther PE. (d) Other PE (2): Option A offers−70 to the decisionmaker
and +70 to the Other participant [S+/O+] with P = 80% or−70 to the decision maker
and−70 to the Other participant [S+/O−] with P = 20%. Option B offers the same out-
comes but with opposite contingencies. Notice that both options offer negative outcomes
to Self. (e) Self andOther PE (1): In this and the next condition both self and other PE vary.
Option A offers−70 to the decision maker and +70 to the Other participant [S−/O+]
with P = 80% or +70 to the decision maker and−70 to the Other participant [S+/O−]
with P = 20%. Option B offers the same outcomes but with opposite contingencies.
(f) Self and Other PE (2): Option A offers +70 to the decision maker and +70 to the
Other participant [S+/O+] with P = 80% or−70 to the decision maker and−70 to the
Other participant [S−/O−] with P = 20%. Option B offers the same outcomes but with
opposite contingencies.
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a trial-by-trial basis through separate prediction errors (PES and PEO, re-
spectively), and PEO is transformed to reﬂect the competitive or cooper-
ative preference of a decision-maker. The transformation of PEO
(Fig. 1b) is achieved by weighting the monetary outcome received by
the other person by a γ parameter. For instance, if the other person re-
ceives $70, then, for a competitive person (γ=−1) the algorithmwill
behave as if the outcome is negative (γ × $70= −$70); in contrast, for
a cooperative person (γ=1) a positive outcomewill produce a positive
prediction error. This simple formulation reinforces cooperative and
competitive actions for cooperative and competitive subjects,
respectively.
Differences between expected and experienced outcomes were
modeled using a modiﬁed standard Q-learning algorithm described by
Sutton and Barto (1998) and implemented in a similar instrumental
probabilistic learning task by Pessiglione et al. (2006). As illustrated in
Fig. 1b, at each decision outcome, the algorithm computes (i) an
expected value of the stimulus chosen for the outcome received by
the subject (EVS) and (ii) a second expected value for the outcome re-
ceived by the other subject (EVO). EVS is updated by the usual rule
EVS,t = EVS,t−1 +αS(PES,t), where αS represents a learning rate param-
eter, PES,t represents a prediction error deﬁned as VS,t− EVS,t and VS,t is
the reward received by the subject at time t. Similarly, EVO is updated by
the rule EVO,t = EVO,t − 1 + αO(PEO,t), where αO again represents a
learning rate parameter, PEO,t represents a prediction error deﬁned as
γ(VO,t)− EVO,t and VO,t is the reward received by the subject at time t,
while γ takes the values of 1 or−1 in order to allow for both coopera-
tive and competitive orientations. Thus, if γ=−1, then a positive out-
come for the other person is subjectively perceived as a negative
outcome for the decision maker. The probability of choosing one
stimulus over another is estimated by the softmax rule. For example,
the probability of choosing stimulus A is estimated as Pa(t) =
exp(EVNET,A(t) / β) / (exp(EVNET,A (t) / β) + exp(EVNET,B(t) / β)),
where EVNET,A = EVS,A + EVO,A and EVNET,B = EVS,B + EVO,B and β is a
temperature parameter.
We estimated gamma (γ) for each subject by focusing on the two
conditions in which outcomes delivered to the other varied, while
outcomes delivered to self were kept constant (conditions [self−70/
other −70; self −70/other +70] & [self +70/other −70; self +70/
other +70] illustrated in Figs. 2c and d). For that reason, the estimation
procedure followed two steps: in the ﬁrst step we estimated learning
rates (αS, αO), gamma (γ) and temperature (β) for each subject in
these two conditions only. The goal of this step was to extract the γ
that best ﬁt these two conditions. Subsequently, the estimated γ value
was used as a constant for estimations in all other conditions; all other
parameters were estimated within each block in order to maximize
the likelihood of the model choosing participants' actual choices.
Allowing γ to take the values of−1 or +1 enabled the model to ac-
count for the social preference of individual participants. For example,
when a competitive individual chose a stimulus that resulted in an un-
expectedly positive outcome for their social partner, negative values of
γmean that the positive reward for the social partner translates into a
negative update of the Q-value associated with the chosen stimulus.
Average learning rates (αS, αO), temperature (β), mean negative log
likelihood and pseudo-R2 (Camerer and Ho, 1998) for each subgroup
and condition are reported in SM Table 1. Pseudo-R2 is deﬁned as
(r− l) / r, where r is the log likelihood of a model choosing randomly
and l is the log likelihood of our model. The estimated pseudo-R2
assessing model ﬁt was comparable to previous reports of modeling
choice behavior (mean pseudo-R2 for our model: .32; (Daw et al.,
2006): .31; (Li and Daw, 2011): .35; (Rutledge et al., 2009): .18;
(Simon and Daw, 2011): .28).
We also estimated the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) for alter-
native models discussed below. We employed the following formula
to estimate the AIC: AIC = 2k− 2Log(L), where k is the number of pa-
rameters and L is the log likelihood of each model, estimated across alltrials and subjects. Lower AIC values indicate a better ﬁt of the observed
behavior. The number of parameters for each model is described in the
Results section.
Results
Neural prediction error signal for self-value
To identify activity underlying prediction errors associatedwith out-
comes for oneself (PES), we focused on four experimental conditions in
which self-value differed for outcomes associated with A and B. In the
ﬁrst manipulation (Fig. 2a), choosing one stimulus resulted in gains
for oneself (+70 points, ±5) and for the other participant (+70
points, ±5) with 80% probability, whereas it yielded loss for oneself (−
70 points, ±5) and gain for the other participant (+70 points, ±5)
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tions, but with the probabilities reversed (i.e., self-gain, other-gain with
20% probability and self-loss, other-gain with 80% probability). Note
that both stimuli resulted in a positive outcome (+70) for the other par-
ticipant. Thus, this ﬁrst experimental manipulation is similar to previous
studies of value-learning for oneself, as actions are guided by differences
in value for the decision-maker only. Similarly, in a second condition
(Fig. 2b) possible outcomes were either (+70 self/−70 other) or (−70
self/−70 other), thus allowing ‘self’ outcomes to primarily guide learn-
ing. In two additional conditions (Figs. 2e and f), possible outcomes dif-
fered for oneself, as well as for the social partner.
When PESwere parametrically regressed to the hemodynamic activ-
ity at the outcome of each decision, correlated neural activitywas found
in bilateral ventral striatum across all conditions (Fig. 3a, upper panel;
coordinates for PES across all conditions combined: 4,10,−4, P b .01,
FWE whole-brain-corrected), consistent with previous studies of self-
interested probabilistic learning (Hare et al., 2008; Pessiglione et al.,
2006). The robustness of PES-related activity in the striatum across con-
ditions was conﬁrmed by separately examining the statistical signiﬁ-
cance at peak voxels in ventral striatum within each condition
separately (Fig. 3a, lower panel). This analysis conﬁrmed signiﬁcant
PES-related activity in striatum for each condition.Preference-dependent prediction error learning of other-value
Prediction errors for outcomes to others (PEO)weremodeled using a
similar reinforcement learning algorithm as PES above, substituting
other-value for self-value (Fig. 1b; see Supplementary material).Fig. 3. Self and other prediction error. (a) Prediction error signal for self-value. In each of 72 sub
four experimental conditions and subsequently regressed to hemodynamic activity. The four co
differed between the two available options. Upper panel: Consistent with previous reports o
revealed PES-related activity in ventral striatum (coordinates 4,10,−4; P b .005, FWE whole-b
of the four conditions (most signiﬁcant voxel in striatum plotted for each condition: 6,4,−4;
the condition in which the two options yield either a positive or negative outcome to Self and
which the two options yield positive or negative outcomes for both self and other. Z-Values
3.09), indicating striatal PES signal to be evident both within and across conditions. (b) Predic
updating of other-value (PES) were estimated across four experimental conditions and subseq
e, f, and correspond to the conditions in which other-value differed between the two available
related activity in medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC; coordinates 10,54,0; P b .001, FWE whole
10,50,2) are plotted separately for each of the four conditions. Z-Values for each of the four co
PEO signal to be evident both within and across conditions. (c) Beta values representing ﬁtt
10,54,0) and ventral striatum (coordinate 4,10,−4). The interaction of Region × PE type is signHowever, to incorporate cooperative and competitive orientation to-
ward social partners, our algorithmweighted other-value by a parame-
ter, γ, that took values of +1 or−1. The right panel of Fig. 1b illustrates
the effect of the γ parameter. Consider the perspective of a decision-
maker when a choice results in a social partner receiving +70, an
amount that exceeds the expectations of the decision-maker. A cooper-
ative individual, with γ=+1, would subjectively experience the result
to be an unexpectedly good outcome, corresponding to a positive pre-
diction error that updates EVO to be more positive. In contrast, a com-
petitive individual, with γ = −1, would subjectively experience the
result as an unexpectedly bad outcome, corresponding to a negative
prediction error that updates EVO to be more negative. In this
way, inclusion of the γ parameter enables the model to incorporate
preference-dependent prediction errors, and these prediction errors
update EVO to reﬂect the subjective perspective of the decision-maker
(not the social partner).Support for the model
As it is the case for all computational approaches trying to explain
neurobehavioral data, the space of possible models is very large. Thus,
there is the possibility that an alternative model that either we have
not considered or the present data do not easily accommodate could ex-
plain the underlying process in a better way. Here, we provide evidence
supporting the present model in three ways: (i) we emplοy an external
measure of social preference to provide external validation for the in-
cluded γ parameter of our model; (ii) we relate a model-free estimate
of social preference within our task to the included γ parameterjects, prediction errors associated with updating of self-value (PES) were estimated across
nditions are depicted in Figs. 2a, b, e, f, and correspond to the conditions inwhich self-value
f PE-related hemodynamic activity, a random-effects analysis across the four conditions
rain-corrected). Lower panel: Z-values in ventral striatum are plotted separately for each
−8,20,−2; 16,6,−8;−14,−2,6, respectively). For example, the ﬁrst bar corresponds to
always a positive outcomes to Other, while the last bar corresponds to the condition in
for each of the four conditions exceeded the threshold for P b .001 (equivalent Z-value:
tion error signal for other-value. Preference-dependent prediction errors associated with
uently regressed to hemodynamic activity. The four conditions are depicted in Figs. 2c, d,
options. Upper panel: A random-effects analysis across the four conditions revealed PEO-
-brain-corrected). Lower panel: Z-values in MPFC (coordinates 4,60,14; 12,58,12; 4,58,2;
nditions exceeded the threshold for P b .001 (equivalent Z-value: 3.09), indicating MPFC
ed responses to ‘self’ [blue] and ‘other’ [red] PE in medial prefrontal cortex (coordinate
iﬁcant (F71 = 9.3; P b .005).
331G.I. Christopoulos, B. King-Casas / NeuroImage 104 (2015) 326–335estimates, and (iii) we compare goodness-of-ﬁts metrics of the present
model to corresponding metrics of a number of alternative models de-
scribed below.
External measures
External validity for the ﬁtted γ parameter values was established
through a non-learning choice task designed to assess social value ori-
entation (SVO; (McClintock and Liebrand, 1988), (Kelly and Stahelski,
1970; Kuhlman and Marshello, 1975; Sattler and Kerr, 1991; Van
Lange and Kuhlman, 1994)). In this task, participants completed a series
of psychophysics-based, adaptively updated dictator games (SM Fig. 1;
SM Table 2). This procedure yields an estimate of the extent to which
social agents prefer allocations that maximize the sum of the self and
other outcomes (“Cooperative”), prefer allocations that maximize the
signed difference between self and other outcomes (“Competitive”),
or are indifferent to the outcomes of others (“Individualistic”), seeking
to maximize only their own outcomes. The correspondence between
the SVO metric and ﬁtted values of γ is illustrated in Fig. 4a. Values of
γ for SVO-determined competitive individuals were negative, values
of γ for SVO-determined cooperative individuals were positive, andFig. 4. Prediction error for “Other Values” (VO). (a) We divided the group of the 72 participants
Materials andmethods). In this separate task, participants chose between allocations of an endo
Individualistic, or Competitive orientation of each participant.We used themean SVO±1/2 std.
parameter determining social preferences in thehybrid learningmodel) is plotted on the y-axis.
competitive orientation. (b) For each subjectwe tested a binary logistic regressionmodel with t
choice (stay or switch) in the present trial as the dependent variable. We then created three gro
deviation as boundary criterion. Positive beta values correspond to a higher probability of choo
determining social preferences in the hybrid learning model) is plotted on the y-axis for each
social value orientation and time. X-axis represents time since onset of outcome screen. Y-axis re
PE minus negative PE in 72 subjects. To facilitate comparison, we multiplied the PEO-related he
perspective of the ‘other’ social partner. Thus, the positive PEO of the cooperative decision-mak
ative PEO of the competitive decision-maker (again, better than expected from the perspective
PE for the three groups. Dotted line represents the boundaries separating the three groups. (d)
BOLD response 4 s after the onset of the outcome screen (Y-axis).SVO-determined individualists had values of γ that did not differ from
zero on average. Note that while individual estimates of γ take values
of either−1 or 1, the average of the group of SVO-determined individ-
ualists did not differ from zero.Model-free estimations
To conﬁrm that ﬁtted values of γ reﬂect social orientation expressed
within the learning task, binary logistic regressions for each subject's
data were estimated using self- and other-outcomes in the previous
trial as predictors and choice (‘stay’=1; ‘switch’=0) as the dependent
variable. Beta coefﬁcients associated with other-outcomes are plotted
against average ﬁtted values of γ in Fig. 4b. Individuals whowere likely
to ‘switch’ following a positive other-outcome in the logistic regression
were also estimated to have negative values of γ in the hybridmodel es-
timation, individuals who were likely to ‘stay’ following a positive
other-outcome in the model-free analysis had positive values of γ, and
individuals who were as likely to ‘stay’ as they were to ‘switch’ regard-
less of the other-outcome had values of γ that did not differ from zero
on average.into three groups based upon an independent assessment of social value orientation (see
wment between oneself and an anonymous social partner, thus revealing the Cooperative,
deviation as boundary criterion. For each SVO-determined group, the average γ (i.e., ﬁtted
Positiveγ is consistentwith a cooperative orientation,while negativeγ is consistentwith a
he ‘outcome to self’ and ‘outcome to other’ received on the previous trial as predictors; the
ups based on the estimated betas associatedwith VO, using themean beta value±1/2 std.
sing “stay”when VO of the previous trials is positive. The average γ (i.e., ﬁtted parameter
group. (c) Differential BOLD response to positive and negative PE as a function of valence,
presents social value orientation. The heatmap represents ﬁtted BOLD response to positive
modynamic response by each decision-maker's γ, thus transforming the PEO signal to the
er (better than expected from the perspective of ‘other’) becomes comparable to the neg-
of ‘other’). Insets on the right depict peristimulus time histograms to positive and negative
Correlation (r= .37; P b .005) between social value orientation (X-axis) and difference in
Table 1
Relationship of behavioral PEO to neural response inMPFC. NoteMPFC activity is negative-
ly related to the modeled PEO.
Subject's social preference Outcome to other Behavioral PEO MPFC response
Cooperative Positive $ (+) Positive (+) Negative (−)
Cooperative Negative $ (−) Negative (−) Positive (+)
Individualistic Positive $ (+) Zero (±0) Negligible
Individualistic Negative $ (−) Zero (±0) Negligible
Competitive Positive $ (+) Negative (−) Positive (+)
Competitive Negative $ (−) Positive (+) Negative (−)
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The goodness-of-ﬁt of the current model was also compared with a
number of alternative models described below:
• Alternative model (i). A ﬁrst possibility is to allow γ to freely vary be-
tween−1 and +1. We tested this model and found mean Akaike In-
formation Criterion (AIC) values to be greater for the alternative
model (original model: 531.08 [19 free parameters: 6 conditions × 3
parameters (α Self (learning parameter for self), α Other (learning
parameter for other), β (temperature)) + one γ (social orientation
weighting parameter of−1 or +1)] vs. alternative model: 533.5 [19
free parameters: 6 conditions × 3 parameters + one γ varying in the
[−1, 1]]. On a ﬁrst reading the two AIC values seem comparable but
we have to consider that the alternative model allows for γ to take
all possible values between−1 and +1 (as compared to the original
model which allows only two values). AIC is unable to capture this var-
iability as it is sensitive only to the number of parameters and not the
values they are allowed to take. Therefore, by lex parsimoniae, i.e. that
models that recruit shorter computations are assigned higher probabil-
ities and therefore preferred (Gauch, 2003) the judgment is in favor of
the original model.
• Alternative model (ii) (18 free parameters: 6 conditions × 3 parame-
ters). To assess the impact of γ on the behavioral ﬁt of the model, AIC
values were also compared for models with and without γ. The AIC
for the model without γwas 558.6.
• Alternative model (iii) (13 free parameters: 6 conditions × 2 parame-
ters + one γ).
Another possibility is that instead of participants computing each value
(self and other) separately, they actually compute a weighted combi-
nation of the self and other outcome values in a single step (i.e. there
is one prediction error based on updating the value of the bundle:
Vtot = Vself + γVother). This model also has higher AIC values
(562.40).
• Alternative model (iv) (12 free parameters: 6 conditions × 2 parame-
ters). Another possibility is that participants altogether ignore the
value offered to the other person. This can be modeled by setting
γ = 0 for the original model, which means that the “other” values
are not used in the computation of the value of (and the associated
probabilities of choosing) each stimulus. This model also has higher
AIC values (561.85).
• Alternative model (v) (13 free parameters: 6 conditions × 2 parame-
ters + one γ). Another possibility is that participants have the same
learning α parameter for self and other values. This model also has
higher AIC values (563.37).
Neural prediction error signal for other-value
To examine how decision-makers learn how their choices map onto
outcomes for social partners, we focused on four manipulations in
which other-value differed for outcomes A and B (Figs. 2c, d, e, f). In
one of these manipulations (Fig. 2c), choosing one stimulus resulted in
gain for oneself (+70) and gain for the other participant (+70) with
P = 80%, and, with P = 20%, it yielded gain for oneself (+70) and loss
for the other participant (−70). Again, the alternative stimulus yielded
the same outcomes, but the probabilities were reversed. In another ma-
nipulation (Fig. 2d), outcomes to social partners were the same as de-
scribed above, but outcomes to oneself were losses (−70) rather than
gains. In two additional manipulations (Figs. 2e and f), both self-value
and other-value varied across the two options, allowing the examina-
tion of both PES and PEO simultaneously.
Preference-dependent PEO was calculated as described above
(Fig. 1b), and parametrically regressed to hemodynamic activity at the
outcome of each decision. Strikingly, this analysis identiﬁed a strong
correlate of PEO in medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), indicating that he-
modynamic activity in this region reﬂects the updating of value expec-
tations for others in a manner that takes into account the socialpreference of the decision-maker (Fig. 3b, upper panel; coordinates
for PEO across all conditions combined: 10,54,0, P b .01, FWE whole
brain corrected). The robustness of PEO-related activity in MPFC across
conditions was further tested by separately examining statistical signif-
icance at peak voxels in MPFCwithin each condition separately (Fig. 3b,
lower panel). This analysis conﬁrmed signiﬁcant PEO-related activity in
MPFC for each condition.
To further elucidate the PEO signal we explored the MPFC response
as a function of the valence of the PEO and the SVO (Fig. 4c). To facilitate
this analysis, we multiplied the PEO-related hemodynamic response by
each decision-maker's γ, thus transforming the PEO signal to the per-
spective of the ‘other’ social partner. In doing so, the positive PEO of
the cooperative decision-maker (better than expected from the
perspective of ‘other’) becomes comparable to the negative PEO of the
competitive decision-maker (again, better than expected from the per-
spective of ‘other’). We subsequently subtracted hemodynamic re-
sponses of trials associated with unexpectedly positive outcomes to
‘other’ fromhemodynamic responses of trials associatedwith unexpect-
edly negative outcomes to ‘other’, and plotted the resulting difference
by SVO (Fig. 4c). The resulting heatmap reveals that cooperative partic-
ipants have higher MPFC response when they experience an unexpect-
ed negative outcome for the other person (see also Table 1). This
difference is gradually reversed as SVO decreases: competitive partici-
pants have higher MPFC response for unexpectedly positive outcomes
for the social partner. Notice that for SVOclose to zero, the difference be-
tween the two signals is negligible. Taken together, these data indicate
that MPFC signals outcomes that are preference-incongruent.
An alternative hypothesis for the apparent indifference of individu-
alists to PEO is that individualists may be modulating their behavior de-
pending on whether they themselves receive positive or negative
outcomes. For example, it could be the case that an individualist seeks
to minimize envy and guilt by both seeking negative outcomes for
others when receiving negative outcomes for oneself (condition S−/
O− vs. S−/O+) and seeking positive outcomes for otherswhen receiv-
ing positive outcomes for oneself (condition S+/O− vs. S+/O+). To
explore this possibility, we examined whether individualists remain in-
different to the outcome of others regardless of their own outcomes, or
whether orientation toward others is dependent on self-value.
Behaviorally, we found that SVO-deﬁned individualists exhibited no
preference for positive or negative outcomes to others, either when
consistently receiving positive self-values (null hypothesis that
individuals choose S+/O+and S+/O− in Fig. 2awith equal frequency;
p = .34, t = .97, df = 33) or when consistently receiving negative self-
values (null hypothesis that individuals choose S−/O− and S−/O+ in
Fig. 2b with equal frequency: p = .82; t = .23, df = 33). Similarly, we
found no evidence that individualists respond differentially to PEO in
MPFC as a function of valence for either of these conditions (S+/O+
vs. S+/O−; S−/O+ vs. S−/O−). That is, the prediction error re-
sponses following either positive value outcomes to other or negative
value outcomes to other did not differ in either condition (SM Fig. 4;
SM Tables 4 & 5).
Finally, to quantify the suggested neural dissociation of PES and the
preference-incongruent PEO, we examined neural correlates of PES and
PEO in both striatum and MPFC (Fig. 3c). A repeated-measures 2 × 2
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P b .005), conﬁrming that the striatum andMPFC preferentially encode
PES and PEO, respectively.
Discussion
Across four experimental conditions, our results provide strong evi-
dence that prediction error learning signals in MPFC are used to update
value for social partners, in a way that is topographically and function-
ally distinct from prediction error signals used to update value for one-
self. Crucially, the PEO signal is strongly associated with individual
differences in how decision-makers prefer to divide resources with so-
cial partners in environments that do not require learning. That is,
while value learning for otherswaswell characterized by the same rein-
forcement learning process that guides non-social reward learning, the
direction and magnitude of the neural signal were strongly determined
by the social goals of the decision-maker: cooperative agents show
increased MPFC activity in response to ‘negative’ outcomes for social
partners, while competitive agents show increased MPFC activity in re-
sponse to ‘good’ outcomes for social partners.
The localization of PEO-related activity across the four tasks (maxi-
mal at 10,54,0) was found to fall within anterior rostral medial prefron-
tal cortex (arMPC), and previous work suggests a critical role of arMPC
inmodelingmental states of other people, includinghowactions impact
social partners (Amodio and Frith, 2006; Bzdok et al., 2013; Coricelli and
Nagel, 2009; Decety and Sommerville, 2003; Gallagher and Frith, 2003;
Hare et al., 2010;McCabe et al., 2001; VanOverwalle and Baetens, 2009;
Winston et al., 2002; Zaki and Mitchell, 2011). Recent studies have im-
plicated MPFC in goal-directed choices that involve social agents
(Behrens et al., 2008; Hampton et al., 2006; Nicolle et al., 2012; Suzuki
et al., 2012; Yoshida et al., 2010), whereas other studies have focused
on the role of striatum in evaluating rewards delivered to others
(Harbaugh et al., 2007; Hsu et al., 2008; Suzuki et al., 2012). The current
results are consistent with Suzuki et al. (2012), suggesting that MPFC is
recruited while learning to simulate the choices of others in addition to
learning for oneself.
Another study (Apps et al., 2013) reported that anterior cingulate
cortex activity correlatedwithprediction error signalswhenmonitoring
(expected or unexpected) outcomes delivered to a second person. In
contrast to the present study, participants in Apps et al. (2013) were
not responsible for the action leading to the outcome of the second per-
son. Taken together, these studies potentially suggest that other-value
prediction error signals are computed separably for outcomes for
which one is responsible, and outcomes for which one's decision does
not determine the outcome, and that only the former is sensitive to
the motivational orientation of the decision-maker.
Individual differences in the direction and magnitude of the PEO
identiﬁed here highlight the importance of polymorphic social orienta-
tion for neurocomputational models of social decision-making
((Kuhlman and Marshello, 1975; McClintock and Liebrand, 1988; Van
Lange and Kuhlman, 1994); (Bowles and Gintis, 2004; Fehr and
Fischbacher, 2002; Kuhlman and Wimberley, 1976; Kurzban and
Houser, 2005)). The current data indicate that social orientation strong-
ly modiﬁes learning-related value-representations for others when
making decisions that impact others. Strikingly, in additional analyses
we ﬁnd no evidence that other-value is represented independent of
the social preference of the decision-maker during social learning.
The present design does not exhaustively examine howVs and Vo are
integrated in the human brain. For example, alternative models have
been suggested (see for instance Van Lange (1999)) that include fairness
or (in)equity considerations. Such models have been constructed to pre-
dict behavior across a wider space of allocations, where the self- and
other-values vary considerably. For the allocations used here, where the
Self or Other values are allowed to vary within a limited space, the alter-
native models would make very similar predictions. Yet, all previous
models assume that Vo is transformed (usually by multiplying with aconstant, as in our case) and this transformation represents the social ori-
entation of the agent. Thus, here, we identify how the outcome received
by the other is weighted using a typical PEST procedure; we ﬁnd that
the weighting is also employed in the learning process and corresponds
to the external metrics (PEST). Finally, our data suggest that MPFC re-
sponses produce prediction error signals that mirror this weighting.
It could be suggested that the brain responses identiﬁed here, espe-
cially the MPFC PEO signal, reﬂect a non-social perceptual or learning
process, and further workwill be required to test this possibility. For ex-
ample, the MPFC signal could reﬂect updating of numeric values more
generally, rather than the value-based outcome to a social partner.
While the current design does not eliminate this possibility, the current
data demonstrate this signal to be systematically related to the social
preferences of participants. Thus, if the MPFC signal indeed reﬂects
more general learning process, it nevertheless appears to be employed
to guide decisions in a social preference-dependent manner.
While the current study focuses on learning when making decisions
impacting others, related work has investigated how information from
others impacts self-interested choices and associated outcomes. Behrens
et al. (2008) and Burke et al. (2010) found that social information and
personal experience are combined to inﬂuence self-interested decisions
and associated outcomes through separable learning signals. In contrast
with this work, however, the PEO signal identiﬁed in our present work
is used to preferentially represent social-orientation weighted outcomes
for others; critically, this information is used to reinforce the values of ac-
tions, akin to prototypic a-social reinforcement learning paradigms. To
our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study to isolate such a signal. It is therefore
expected that further studies will be required to elucidate the exact na-
ture of the preference-dependent PEO signal, as well as its relationship
to PES. Indeed, initial accounts of the classic PES signal were similarly
and necessarily incomplete, and led to the development of a broad ﬁeld
of neurocomputational signals underlying reward-guided learning for
oneself. We expect that the present data will open a variety of research
questions, including those examining the precise spatio-temporal and
computational properties of this signal, possible alterations following
pharmacological manipulations, disease or stress, the impact of various
social norms on its amplitude, and alterations in the neurocomputational
signal in more complex social contexts.
It is noteworthy that the neural learning signals identiﬁed here inde-
pendently encode positive and negative reward prediction errors for
‘self’ and ‘other’ outcomes, respectively. In the case of reward for one-
self, the receipt of an unexpectedly positive outcome leads to an in-
crease in the value associated with the reward-predicting cue, and
activity in ventral striatum mirrors this increase. However, in the case
of rewards for others, the receipt of unexpected preference-congruent
outcomes (i.e., better than expected) leads to decreased activity in
MPFC activity (Fig. 4 and Table 1). The functional signiﬁcance of learning
self- and other-value through opponently-valenced learning signals
here is unclear. One possibility is that decision processes seeking to sat-
isfy multiple goals are hierarchically updated, such that action-value
pairs associatedwith primary goals (e.g.,maximizing self-value) are up-
dated through positive PE, while updating based on secondary goals
(e.g., maximizing value for others) are updated through negative PE.
Thus, cooperative individuals may primarily seek and update good out-
comes for themselves and avoid and update bad outcomes for others
second; while competitive individuals again primarily seek and update
good outcomes for themselves ﬁrst, avoiding good outcomes for others
second. While this speculation cannot be conﬁrmed within the current
task, it suggests a number of questions regarding howmultiple channels
of information are combined and reconciled whenmaking a social deci-
sion and how such outcomes are simultaneously updated.
Conclusions
Taken together, these data reveal neural computations fundamental
to learning in social environments, where it is critical to take into
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the present study is the necessity to incorporate the often ignored fact
that populations and their social orientations are polymorphic — thus
individual differences might exist and actually mask interesting phe-
nomena. The present results bring together the tradition of reinforce-
ment learning, which examines how humans adapt in dynamic
environments, and behavioral game theory, where agents take actions
that impact others. We chose to study a basic question: how outcomes
are evaluated without the presence of any strategic component. The re-
sults suggest that monetary values are early on transformed. This con-
clusion informs the study of more complex strategic interactions as it
implies that the game matrixes (for instance in a prisoner's dilemma
game) are transformed to the so-called “effectivematrixes” (where out-
comes are weighted by social orientation). Finally, we believe that the
present study, along with other similar studies (Decety and Lamm,
2007; Kishida and Montague, 2012; Wolpert et al., 2003) sets the
basis for the further development of the ﬁeld of social computational
neuroscience, where social actions can be formally described by compu-
tational models and neurobiological mechanisms.
Acknowledgments
This work was supported in part by the National Institutes of Health
(DA036017) and Rehabilitation Research and Development Service,
Ofﬁce of Research and Development, Department of Veterans Affairs
(D7030R). We thank P. Chiu, S. LaConte, T. Lohrenz, and P.R. Montague
for comments on this manuscript. G.C. and B.K.C. jointly designed the
study; G.C. implemented the design and collected behavioral and
imaging data; G.C. and B.K.C. jointly conducted the analysis; and G.C.
and B.K.C. jointly prepared the manuscript. The authors declare no
competing ﬁnancial interests.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2014.09.011.
References
Amodio, D.M., Frith, C.D., 2006. Meeting of minds: the medial frontal cortex and social
cognition. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 7, 268–277.
Apps, M.A., Green, R., Ramnani, N., 2013. Reinforcement learning signals in the anterior
cingulate cortex code for others' false beliefs. Neuroimage 64, 1–9.
Bayer, H.M., Glimcher, P.W., 2005. Midbrain dopamine neurons encode a quantitative re-
ward prediction error signal. Neuron 47, 129–141.
Behrens, T.E., Hunt, L.T., Woolrich, M.W., Rushworth, M.F., 2008. Associative learning of
social value. Nature 456, 245–249.
Bowles, S., Gintis, H., 2004. The evolution of strong reciprocity: cooperation in heteroge-
neous populations. Theor. Popul. Biol. 65, 17–28.
Burke, C.J., Tobler, P.N., Baddeley, M., Schultz, W., 2010. Neural mechanisms of observa-
tional learning. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 107, 14431–14436.
Bzdok, D., Langner, R., Schilbach, L., Engemann, D.A., Laird, A.R., Fox, P.T., Eickhoff, S.B.,
2013. Segregation of the human medial prefrontal cortex in social cognition. Front.
Hum. Neurosci. 7, 232.
Camerer, C., Ho, T.H., 1998. Experience-weighted attraction learning in coordination games:
probability rules, heterogeneity, and time-variation. J. Math. Psychol. 42, 305–326.
Chang, L.J., Smith, A., Dufwenberg, M., Sanfey, A.G., 2011. Triangulating the neural, psy-
chological, and economic bases of guilt aversion. Neuron 70, 560–572.
Coricelli, G., Nagel, R., 2009. Neural correlates of depth of strategic reasoning in medial
prefrontal cortex. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 106, 9163–9168.
Crockett, M.J., Clark, L., Hauser, M.D., Robbins, T.W., 2010. Serotonin selectively inﬂuences
moral judgment and behavior through effects on harm aversion. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
U. S. A. 107, 17433–17438.
Daniel, R., Pollmann, S., 2014. A universal role of the ventral striatum in reward-based
learning: evidence from human studies. Neurobiol. Learn. Mem. 114C, 90–100.
D'Ardenne, K., McClure, S.M., Nystrom, L.E., Cohen, J.D., 2008. BOLD responses reﬂecting
dopaminergic signals in the human ventral tegmental area. Science 319, 1264–1267.
Daw, N.D., O'Doherty, J.P., Dayan, P., Seymour, B., Dolan, R.J., 2006. Cortical substrates for
exploratory decisions in humans. Nature 441, 876–879.
Decety, J., Lamm, C., 2007. The role of the right temporoparietal junction in social interac-
tion: how low-level computational processes contribute to meta-cognition. Neurosci-
entist 13, 580–593.
Decety, J., Sommerville, J.A., 2003. Shared representations between self and other: a social
cognitive neuroscience view. Trends Cogn. Sci. 7, 527–533.Delgado, M.R., Li, J., Schiller, D., Phelps, E.A., 2008. The role of the striatum in aversive
learning and aversive prediction errors. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. Ser. B Biol. Sci.
363, 3787–3800.
den Ouden, H.E., Daunizeau, J., Roiser, J., Friston, K.J., Stephan, K.E., 2010. Striatal predic-
tion error modulates cortical coupling. J. Neurosci. 30, 3210–3219.
Fehr, E., Fischbacher, U., 2002. Why social preferences matter— the impact of non-selﬁsh
motives on competition, cooperation and incentives. Econ. J. 112, C1–C33.
Fehr, E., Krajbich, I., 2014. Chapter 11— social preferences and the brain, In: Glimcher, P.W.,
Fehr, E. (Eds.), Neuroeconomics, Second edition Academic Press, SanDiego, pp. 193–218.
Fliessbach, K., Weber, B., Trautner, P., Dohmen, T., Sunde, U., Elger, C.E., Falk, A., 2007. So-
cial comparison affects reward-related brain activity in the human ventral striatum.
Science 318, 1305–1308.
Gallagher, H.L., Frith, C.D., 2003. Functional imaging of ‘theory of mind’. Trends Cogn. Sci.
7, 77–83.
Galvan, A., Hare, T.A., Davidson, M., Spicer, J., Glover, G., Casey, B.J., 2005. The role of ven-
tral frontostriatal circuitry in reward-based learning in humans. J. Neurosci. 25,
8650–8656.
Gauch, H.G., 2003. Scientiﬁc Method in Practice. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Hampton, A.N., Bossaerts, P., O'Doherty, J.P., 2006. The role of the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex in abstract state-based inference during decision making in humans. J.
Neurosci. 26, 8360–8367.
Harbaugh, W.T., Mayr, U., Burghart, D.R., 2007. Neural responses to taxation and volun-
tary giving reveal motives for charitable donations. Science 316, 1622–1625.
Hare, T.A., O'Doherty, J., Camerer, C.F., Schultz, W., Rangel, A., 2008. Dissociating the role of
the orbitofrontal cortex and the striatum in the computation of goal values and pre-
diction errors. J. Neurosci. 28, 5623–5630.
Hare, T.A., Camerer, C.F., Knoepﬂe, D.T., Rangel, A., 2010. Value computations in ventral
medial prefrontal cortex during charitable decision making incorporate input from
regions involved in social cognition. J. Neurosci. 30, 583–590.
Haruno, M., Frith, C.D., 2010. Activity in the amygdala elicited by unfair divisions predicts
social value orientation. Nat. Neurosci. 13, 160–161.
Hsu, M., Anen, C., Quartz, S.R., 2008. The right and the good: distributive justice and neural
encoding of equity and efﬁciency. Science 320, 1092–1095.
Jocham, G., Klein, T.A., Ullsperger, M., 2011. Dopamine-mediated reinforcement learning
signals in the striatum and ventromedial prefrontal cortex underlie value-based
choices. J. Neurosci. 31, 1606–1613.
Kelly, H.H., Stahelski, A.J., 1970. Social interaction basis of cooperators' and competitors'
beliefs about others. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 16.
Kishida, K.T., Montague, P.R., 2012. Imaging models of valuation during social interaction
in humans. Biol. Psychiatry 72, 93–100.
Krugel, L.K., Biele, G., Mohr, P.N.C., Li, S.-C., Heekeren, H.R., 2009. Genetic variation in do-
paminergic neuromodulation inﬂuences the ability to rapidly and ﬂexibly adapt deci-
sions. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 106, 17951–17956.
Kuhlman, D.M., Marshello, A.F., 1975. Individual differences in game motivation as mod-
erators of preprogrammed strategy effects in prisoner's dilemma. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.
32, 922–931.
Kuhlman, D.M., Wimberley, D.L., 1976. Expectations of choice behavior held by coopera-
tors, competitors, and individualists across 4 classes of experimental game. J. Pers.
Soc. Psychol. 34, 69–81.
Kurzban, R., Houser, D., 2005. Experiments investigating cooperative types in humans: a
complement to evolutionary theory and simulations. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A.
102, 1803–1807.
Li, J., Daw, N.D., 2011. Signals in human striatum are appropriate for policy update rather
than value prediction. J. Neurosci. 31, 5504–5511.
Luce, R., 2000. Utility of gains and losses: Measurement-theoretical and experimental
approaches. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, New Jersey.
Lurie, S., 1987. A parametric model of utility for two-person distributions. Psychol. Rev.
94, 42–60.
McCabe, K., Houser, D., Ryan, L., Smith, V., Trouard, T., 2001. A functional imaging study of
cooperation in two-person reciprocal exchange. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 98,
11832–11835.
McClintock, G., Liebrand, W., 1988. Role of interdependence structure, individual value
orientation, and another's strategy in social decisionmaking: a transformational anal-
ysis. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 55, 396–409.
Montague, P.R., King-Casas, B., Cohen, J.D., 2006. Imaging valuation models in human
choice. Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 29, 417–448.
Murphy, R.O., Ackermann, K.A., 2014. Social value orientation: theoretical and
measurement issues in the study of social preferences. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Rev.
18, 13–41.
Nicolle, A., Klein-Flugge, M.C., Hunt, L.T., Vlaev, I., Dolan, R.J., Behrens, T.E., 2012. An agent
independent axis for executed and modeled choice in medial prefrontal cortex. Neu-
ron 75, 1114–1121.
O'Connell, G., Christakou, A., Haffey, A.T., Chakrabarti, B., 2013. The role of empathy in
choosing rewards from another's perspective. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7, 174.
Pessiglione, M., Seymour, B., Flandin, G., Dolan, R.J., Frith, C.D., 2006. Dopamine-
dependent prediction errors underpin reward-seeking behaviour in humans. Nature
442, 1042–1045.
Ramnani, N., Elliott, R., Athwal, B.S., Passingham, R.E., 2004. Prediction error for free mon-
etary reward in the human prefrontal cortex. Neuroimage 23, 777–786.
Rutledge, R.B., Lazzaro, S.C., Lau, B., Myers, C.E., Gluck, M.A., Glimcher, P.W., 2009. Dopa-
minergic drugs modulate learning rates and perseveration in Parkinson's patients
in a dynamic foraging task. J. Neurosci. 29, 15104–15114.
Sattler, D.N., Kerr, N.L., 1991. Might versus morality explored — motivational and cogni-
tive bases for social motives. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 60, 756–765.
Schultz, W., Dayan, P., Montague, P.R., 1997. A neural substrate of prediction and reward.
Science 275, 1593–1599.
335G.I. Christopoulos, B. King-Casas / NeuroImage 104 (2015) 326–335Seymour, B., O'Doherty, J.P., Dayan, P., Koltzenburg, M., Jones, A.K., Dolan, R.J., Friston, K.J.,
Frackowiak, R.S., 2004. Temporal difference models describe higher-order learning in
humans. Nature 429, 664–667.
Simon, D.A., Daw, N.D., 2011. Neural correlates of forward planning in a spatial decision
task in humans. J. Neurosci. 31, 5526–5539.
Sutton, R., Barto, A., 1988. Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction. MIT Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Suzuki, S., Harasawa, N., Ueno, K., Gardner, J.L., Ichinohe, N., Haruno, M., Cheng, K.,
Nakahara, H., 2012. Learning to simulate others' decisions. Neuron 74, 1125–1137.
Tricomi, E., Rangel, A., Camerer, C.F., O'Doherty, J.P., 2010. Neural evidence for inequality-
averse social preferences. Nature 463, 1089–1091.
Van Lange, P.A.M., 1999. The pursuit of joint outcomes and equality in outcomes: An in-
tegrative model of social value orientation. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 77, 337–349.
Van Lange, P.A.M., Kuhlman, D.M., 1994. Social value orientations and impressions of
partner's honesty and intelligence: a test of the might versus morality effect. J. Pers.
Soc. Psychol. 67, 126–141.Van Overwalle, F., Baetens, K., 2009. Understanding others' actions and goals by mirror
and mentalizing systems: a meta-analysis. Neuroimage 48, 564–584.
Winston, J.S., Strange, B.A., O'Doherty, J., Dolan, R.J., 2002. Automatic and intentional brain
responses during evaluation of trustworthiness of faces. Nat. Neurosci. 5, 277–283.
Wolpert, D.M., Doya, K., Kawato, M., 2003. A unifying computational framework for
motor control and social interaction. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 358,
593–602.
Yoshida, W., Seymour, B., Friston, K.J., Dolan, R.J., 2010. Neural mechanisms of belief infer-
ence during cooperative games. J. Neurosci. 30, 10744–10751.
Zaki, J., Mitchell, J.P., 2011. Equitable decision making is associated with neural markers of
intrinsic value. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U. S. A. 108, 19761–19766.
